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Abstract
Using a rational expectations model of proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms facing demand un-
certainty, this paper derives a closed-form relationship between the optimal volume
of labor hoarding and other important economic variables such as proﬁt, expected de-
mand, interest rate, inventory level, output price and wage costs. An important insight
gained from the analysis is that proﬁt-seeking ﬁrms have incentives to enhance supply
ﬂexibility by holding not only goods inventories but also excess supplies of labor in
reserve, so as to fully guard against demand uncertainty. The optimal target level of
labor hoarding is shown to be a function of the variance of demand, the price level
as well as the costs of production. The analysis conﬁrms Blinder’s (1982) conjecture
regarding ﬁrms’ strategic behavior under demand uncertainty. That is, inventories of
labor are partial substitutes for inventories of goods as a means to cope with demand
shocks.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E22, E24, E32.
Keywords: Inventory, Labor Hoarding, Excess Labor, Productivity, Business Cycle.1 Introduction
Despite the fact that labor hoarding (or excess labor) is a widely observed behavior of ﬁrms
(e.g., see Clark 1976, Medoﬀ and Fay 1985, and Fair 1969, 1985) and that this concept
has been constantly invoked in the literature as an explanation for the phenomenon of pro-
cyclical labor productivity (e.g., see Bernanke and Parkinson 1991, Dornbusch and Fischer
1981, Miller 1971, and Rotemberg and Summers 1990, among many others), yet we know
surprisingly little about ﬁrms’ optimal decision rules of labor hoarding. For example, how
does the optimal volume of labor hoarding depend on proﬁts, expected demand, inventory
level, interest rate, output price and wage costs, etc.?1
Using a rational expectations model of proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms facing demand uncer-
tainty, this paper derives a closed-form relationship between the optimal volume of labor
hoarding and other important economic variables such as proﬁt, expected demand, interest
rate, inventory level, output price and wage costs. An important insight gained from the
analysis is that proﬁt-seeking ﬁrms have incentives to enhance supply ﬂexibility by hold-
ing not only goods inventories but also excess supplies of labor in reserve, so as to fully
guard against demand uncertainty. The optimal target level of labor hoarding is shown to
be a function of the variance of demand, the price level as well as the costs of production.
The analysis conﬁrms Blinder’s (1982) conjecture regarding ﬁrms’ strategic behavior under
demand uncertainty. That is, inventories of labor are partial substitutes for inventories of
g o o d sa sam e a n st oc o p ew i t hd e m a n ds h o c k s .
The theoretical model provides not only a convenient framework for econometric analysis
in related empirical issues, but also a genuine micro-foundation for understanding aggregate
employment and labor productivity movements. It is shown that as a consequence of labor
hoarding, measured labor productivity is procyclical despite non-increasing returns to scale.
Interestingly, the model does not require the assumption of unobservable labor eﬀort as an
additional production factor in order to explain procyclical labor productivity. Unobservable
1Using a simple optimization model, Clark (1976) derives an optimal maximum length of time that is
proﬁtable for a ﬁrm to keep a worker on the payroll without having him/her work. Clark’s model, however,
does not deal with uncertainty and it cannot be used for understanding the optimal volume of labor hoarding.eﬀort is a necessary condition for the other types of labor hoarding theory to explain the pro-
cyclical output-labor ratio (e.g., see Rotemberg and Summers 1988, Burnside, Eichenbaum
and Rebelo 1993, and Wen, 2002).
2 The Model
Assume that the ﬁrm’s demand, denoted θ,i sas t a t i o n a r yAR(1) process:
θt = η + ρθt−1 + εt, (1)
where εt is an i.i.d. random variable with normal distribution, N(0,σ2). The maximum
amount the ﬁr mc a ns e l li np e r i o dt is its inventory as of the end of the previous period,
denoted by st−1, plus whatever it produces during period t (yt). Assuming that the goods
price p is suﬃciently high, we have
τt =m i n{θt,s t−1 + yt}, (2)
where τt denotes actual sales in period t. Also assuming that production takes one period,
hence the decision for yt needs to be made one period in advance based on information
available in period t − 1. Further, assuming that labor is the only factor of production and
the production technology has constant returns to scale,
yt = mt. (3)
It is useful to distinguish between workers on line (m) and workers on reserve (h). Workers
on line are those who are engaged in production. Workers on reserve are those who are on
the payroll but do not produce output. The wage rate paid to workers on line each period
is w per worker (w<pis a known constant), and the wage rate paid to workers on reserve
each period is δw,w h e r eδ ∈ (0,β)w i t hβ < 1. The total stock of workers on payroll is
denoted Wt ≡ mt+ht. Since in each period the ﬁrm can either hire or ﬁre workers to adjust
the ﬁrm’s labor stock, the law of motion for the stock of workers is given by Wt = Wt−1+nt,
or
mt + ht = mt−1 + ht−1 + nt, (4)where n is a ﬂow variable denoting new hiring (or ﬁring) of workers. The right hand side,
(mt−1 + ht−1 + nt), is hence the total stock of workers available for working in the be-
g i n n i n go fap e r i o d . I ti sa l s oa s s u m e dt h a td e c i s i o n sf o rnt (hiring or ﬁring) need to be
made one period in advance prior to production (e.g., due to time involved in search and
job training).
The proﬁts in period t are simply revenue minus costs, pτt−w(mt + δht + nt). Denoting
β ∈ (0,1) as the ﬁrm’s time discounting factor (the inverse of interest rate), the problem
for the ﬁrm is to choose sequences of new hiring (or ﬁring), {nj}
∞
j=t, the number of workers
on line {mj}
∞
j=t, the number of workers on reserve {hj}
∞



















j [pτt+j − w(mt+j + δht+j + nt+j)]
)))
subject to the law of motion for inventories in the goods market (without loss of generality,
assuming that inventories depreciate at zero rate):
τt + st = st−1 + yt, (5)
the production function (3), the law of motion for employment stock (4), and two non-
negativity constraints on inventory stocks for goods and labor respectively:
st ≥ 0, (6)
ht ≥ 0; (7)
where (6) is implied by (2). The expectation operators, {Et−2,E t−1,E t}, in the objective
function reﬂect the relevant information sets in the sequence of decision making: the ﬁrm
decides ﬁrst how many workers to hire (lay oﬀ) based on information available in period
t−2, then how much output to produce one period later by choosing the number of workers
on line and the number of workers on reserve based on updated information on expected
demand in period t − 1, and then on the level of sales or inventory holdings after observing
the actual demand in period t.Denoting λs (> 0) and λh(> 0) as the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the goods
market resource constraint (5) and the labor market resource constraint (4) respectively,
and πs (≥ 0) and πh (≥ 0) as the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the non-negativity
constraints (6) and (7) respectively, the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to {nt,m t,h t,s t}

























where the complementary slackness constraints on goods inventories and labor inventories






t ht =0 .
These six equations together with equations (4) and (5) determine eight unknowns in the




3A n a l y s i s
Given output price (λs
t) and the availability of ﬁnished goods (yt+st−1)a sw e l la st h er e a l i z e d
demand shocks (θ) at the beginning of period t, the ﬁrm chooses inventory holdings (st)t o
maximize proﬁt. Consider two possible cases:
Case A1. The demand shock is below “normal”, hence the existing supply (yt + st−1)i s
suﬃcient to meet demand. In this case, we have st ≥ 0a n dπs
t = 0. Equation (11) implies
that the Lagrangian multiplier of goods is a constant, λs
t = ¯ λ. Since demand can be satisﬁed,
we have τt = θt. The level of inventory holdings is given by
st = yt + st−1 − θt.Since st ≥ 0, the threshold level of preference shock determining that the ﬁrm is in case A1
is then given by yt + st−1 − θt ≥ 0o re q u i v a l e n t l y ,b y
θt ≤ yt + st−1.
Case B1. The demand shock is above “normal”, and the existing goods supply (yt+st−1)
falls short in meeting the demand. In this case we have st =0a n dπs
t > 0. Since sales are
constrained by supply, we have
τt = yt + st−1.
Notice that the probability distribution of case A1 and case B1 (i.e., the probability
of stocking out in period t) depends not only on demand but also crucially on the supply
(production) level of goods (yt) ,w h i c hi sd e t e r m i n e di np e r i o dt−1 by the optimal amount
of workers put on line (mt).
Equation (9) shows that mt is be chosen such that the cost of putting one more worker
on line (= wage cost plus the shadow value of labor resource, w + λh
t)e q u a l st h eb e n e ﬁto f
having an extra worker on line (= the value of the marginal product of a worker, which is
the expected next period value of goods, Et−1λs
t, plus the discounted wage cost saved next
period by having the worker on stock, βw). Denoting
zt ≡ Et−1st = yt + st−1 − Et−1θt
as the level of inventory holdings such that the ﬁrm will stock out in period t if and only if
εt ≥ zt, then the expected goods price can be expanded into two terms (denoting the p.d.f










where λs = ¯ λ(<w ) with probability
R z
−∞ f(ε)dε if there is no stockout (i.e., case A1),2 and
λs = p with probability
R ∞
z f(ε)dε if there is a stockout (i.e., the value of inventory equals
market price p when the goods are sold). Given the law of motion for preference shocks,
2For a proof of ¯ λ <w ,see proposition 3.3.θt = Et−1θt + εt, equation (9) then becomes3
(1 − β)w + λ
h








where Γ() is a monotonically decreasing function of z.S i n c e z is proportional to y(= m)
by deﬁnition, the more workers being put on line in period t − 1( m), the less likely there
is a stockout in period t given expected demand Et−1θt. Thus equation (12) determines the
optimal cut-oﬀ value of z and hence the optimal amount of workers on line for production
in period t − 1.
Turning to the left-hand side of equation (12), the shadow value of labor (λh) depends
on the tightness of the ﬁrm’s labor resource (i.e., whether the nonnegativity constraint on
workers in reserve binds). There are two cases to consider for the possible values of λh:
Case A2. The expected demand for goods is below “normal” and hence the demand for
workers on line (mt) is below “normal”. In this case we have ht ≥ 0a n dπh
t = 0. Hence
equation (10) implies that the value of labor is constant,4
λ
h
t =( β − δ)w.
The interpretation for (β − δ)w is straightforward. In case there is no stockout in workers,
by having one more worker on reserve the ﬁrm gets to save on the wage cost of new hiring
next period (with a discounted value of βw). Subtracting from this the cost of keeping the
worker on reserve in the current period (δw) gives the net beneﬁto fh a v i n gaw o r k e ro n
reserve, (β − δ)w,w h i c hm u s te q u a lt h ev a l u eo fl a b o r( λh).
In this case, equation (12) implies that the optimal target inventory level zt based on
period t − 1 information is a constant: zt = k, where k solves
Γ(k)=( 1− δ)w.
This implies that the optimal production level (yt) is determined by the equation,
k = yt + st−1 − Et−1θt,
3Equation 8 implies Et−1λh
t+1 = w.
4Equation 8 implies Et−1λh
t+1 = w.or equivalently, by
yt = Et−1θt +( k − st−1). (13)
Hence, optimal production is characterized by a policy that speciﬁes a constant target
level for inventory holdings (k) or a target level of inventory investment (k−st−1), such that
production moves one-for-one with expected demand (Et−1θt) given the target inventory
investment level, provided that the ﬁrm is in case A2 (i.e., provided there is no stockout in
workers: ht ≥ 0). This inventory target policy is similar to that derived by Kahn (1987) in
a model without labor hoarding.
Using equation (4), the requirement ht ≥ 0 implies that the threshold level of expected
demand that determines the probability of “stockout” in workers on reserve is given by,
mt−1 + ht−1 + nt − yt ≥ 0,
or equivalently, by
Et−1θt ≤ mt−1 + ht−1 + nt − (k − st−1), (14)
w h e r ew eh a v es u b s t i t u t e do u tyt using the optimal policy (13). That is, if expected total
demand (which equals expected sales, Et−1θt, plus inventory investment demand, k−st−1)i s
less than the potential supply (which equals the total supply of the stock of workers according
to the one-to-one transformation technology, y = m), then some workers should be put on
reserve (i.e., ht ≥ 0) and the optimal number of workers on line (m = y) is characterized by
the policy (13).
Case B2. The expected demand for goods is above “normal”, and hence the demand for
w o r k e r so nl i n ei sa b o v e“ n o r m a l ” .I nt h i sc a s e ,w eh a v eht =0a n dπh
t > 0, implying that
there is a stockout in workers on reserve. Hence, the optimal number of workers on line is
simply
mt = mt−1 + ht−1 + nt.
In this case, the tightness in labor resource pushes shadow price of labor upwards, so that
λh
t =( β − δ)w + πh
t > (β − δ)w.
Clearly, whether the ﬁrm is in position A2 or position B2 depends not only on expected
demand in period t−1( Et−1θt), but also on the availability of labor stock (mt−1+ht−1+nt)in period t − 1, which depends on hiring/ﬁring decisions (nt)m a d ei np e r i o dt − 2. Thus,
the optimal decision rules of the entire model depend on the decision rule for n.
Equation (8) shows that nt should be chosen such that the marginal cost of hiring, w,
equals the expected next period value of labor resource (the shadow value of labor, Et−2λh
t).
Since the value of λh depends on the tightness in the reserved labor resource, there are two
possibilities to consider: in case A2, λh =( β −δ)w;a n di nc a s eB2, λh = Et−1λs −(1−β)w




[mt−1 + ht−1 + nt − Et−2θt]( 1 4 0)
as the level of labor hoarding (workers on reserve), which equals total labor stock available for
working (or potential supply of goods, m+h+n) minus expected workers on line (measured
by expected goods demand, Et−2θ), such that the ﬁrm stockout of workers in period t−1i f
a n do n l yi fd e m a n di nt h a tp e r i o di st o oh i g h( εt−1 ≥ ζ).5 Then the expected value of labor












t − (1 − β)w]f(ε)dε,
5To see how ζ is derived, note that st−1 in the expression (14) can take only two possible values
st−1 =
½
k − εt−1, if εt−1 ≤ k
0, if εt−1 >k
Hence (14) can be rewritten as
Et−1θt ≤
½
mt−1 + ht−1 + nt − εt−1 if εt−1 ≤ k
mt−1 + ht−1 + nt − k if εt−1 >k
Utilizing the identity, Et−1θt = Et−2θt + ρεt−1, the above two inequalities can be rearranged as
(1 + ρ)εt−1 ≤
½
mt−1 + ht−1 + nt − Et−2θt if εt−1 ≤ k
mt−1 + ht−1 + nt − Et−2θt − (k − εt−1) if εt−1 >k
Clearly, the ﬁrst inequality implies the second inequality given that (k − εt−1) < 0 in the second inequality.




[mt−1 + ht−1 + nt − Et−2θt] ≡ ζt.where the ﬁrst term represents the probability of case A2 and the second represents the prob-
ability of case B2. Equation (15) implicitly determines the cut-oﬀ value for ζt as the optimal
volume of labor hoarding. Given ζt, the optimal hiring/ﬁring policy for n is consequently
determined. The following proposition shows that the optimal solution for ζt is a constant.
Proposition 1 The optimal volume of labor hoarding is a constant, ζt = γ, that solves the
following implicit equation,
w =( β − δ)wΦ(
γ
σ























where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function of ε.
Proof. See Appendix 001.¥
This optimal policy for labor hoarding, ζt = γ,r e ﬂects a precautionary motive of the
ﬁrm to avoid stockouts in workers when demand is uncertain and when labor replenishment
takes time. This labor-hoarding target (γ) determines the optimal decision rule for nt by
equation (140),
nt = Et−2θt +( 1+ρ)γ − (mt−1 + ht−1).
This equation says that in equilibrium the optimal hiring/ﬁring plan (n)i ss u c ht h a tt h et o t a l
labor stock (nt+mt−1+ht−1, which equals potential output supply) equals the expected labor
usage (which equals the expected demand, Et−2θt) plus a target volume of labor hoarding
(γ).
Proposition 2 The optimal inventory target for labor is higher than that for goods,
γ ≥ k.
Proof. See Appendix 002.¥
The intuition behind proposition 2 can be understood as follows. Based on the one-for-
one transformation production technology, one worker’s labor is equivalent to one unit of
output. Hence labor inventories can be viewed essentially as intermediate goods inventories.The probability of a stockout in ﬁnished goods in period-t is aﬀected by the probability of a
stockout in intermediate goods (labor) in period t−1, as the potential supply of ﬁnishedgoods
is determined by the potential supply of intermediate goods (labor), which is determined
by employment (hiring/ﬁring) decisions made in period t − 2. Under a stockout-avoidance
motive, the optimal size of inventory targets, {k,γ}, are positively inﬂuenced by the degree
of uncertainty in ﬁnal demand. The earlier the decision has to be made, the harder it is
to forecast ﬁnal demand due to the increased uncertainty, hence the larger precautionary
inventory stock it is needed in order to be better positioned to take advantage of periods in
which demand is higher than normal.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium decision rules for goods inventories (s), sales (τ), produc-
tion (y) - which also equals equilibrium utilization of labor stock (m), labor hoarding (h),





k − εt ; if εt ≤ k & εt−1 ≤ γ
(1 + ρ)γ − εt − ρεt−1 ; if εt ≤ k & εt−1 > γ





Et−1θt + εt ; if εt ≤ k
Et−1θt + k ; if εt >k& εt−1 ≤ γ
Et−2θt +( 1+ρ)γ ; if εt >k& εt−1 > γ




Et−1θt + εt−1 ; if εt−1 ≤ k & εt−2 ≤ γ
Et−1θt + k − (1 + ρ)γ + εt−1 + ρεt−2 ; if εt−1 ≤ k & εt−2 > γ
Et−1θt + k ; if k<εt−1 ≤ γ





(1 + ρ)γ − (1 + ρ)εt−1 ; if εt−1 ≤ k & εt−2 ≤ γ
2(1 + ρ)γ − k − (1 + ρ)εt−1 − ρεt−2 ; if εt−1 ≤ k & εt−2 > γ
(1 + ρ)γ − k − ρεt−1 ; if k<εt−1 ≤ γ
0; if εt−1 > γ
nt = Et−2θt − Et−3θt−1.
where ¯ λ = β(1 − δ)w.Proof. See Appendix 003.¥
The intuition behind the decision rule for hiring/ﬁring is the simplest to understand.
Since labor is a perfectly durable input in the model, hence whether to hire or ﬁre more
workers depends solely on changes in expected demand. If expected demand remains con-
stant, then there is no need to adjust the ﬁrm’s stock of workers. If demand is expected to
increase, then the ﬁrm opts to hire, otherwise it opts to layoﬀ.
Proposition 4 The optimal volume of labor hoarding depends positively on the variance of
demand (σ), the price level (p), and negatively on interest rate ( 1
β), labor hoarding cost (δ)
















Proof. See Appendix 004.¥
4 Procyclical Labor Productivity
It is well known that measured labor productivity (or output per worker) is strongly procycli-
cal. This phenomenon is puzzling because given the assumption of non-increasing returns
to labor, one percent increase in labor can lead to no more than one percent increase in
output, hence output per worker is expected to be negatively correlated with output level
— in sharp contrast to what the data suggest. Labor hoarding has been one of the most
popular explanations oﬀered in the literature for resolving this long-standing puzzle. The
intuition is that if ﬁrms hoard labor during a downturn, then the drop in output will appear
to be larger than the drop in measured employment based on ﬁrms’ payroll statistics. On the
other hand during an upturn, ﬁrms can increase output by utilizing hoarded labor without
new hiring. Thus measured productivity appears to be procyclical.
In the current model, since production technology is linear, the output/labor ratio is
expected to be constant (acyclical). However, since the ﬁrm opts to hold excess labor on
reserve so as to be better positioned to take advantage of periods in which demand is higher
than normal, the resulting measured output/labor ratio is procyclical.To see this, notice that based on the decision rules given above, output-to-workers ratio





         
         
Et−2θt+(1+ρ)εt−1
Et−2θt+(1+ρ)γ ;i fεt−1 ≤ k & εt−2 ≤ γ
Et−2θt+k−(1+ρ)γ+(1+ρ)εt−1+ρεt−2
Et−2θt+(1+ρ)γ ;i fεt−1 ≤ k & εt−2 > γ
Et−2θt+k+ρεt−1
Et−2θt+(1+ρ)γ ;i fk<εt−1 ≤ γ
1; i f εt−1 > γ
.
Notice that as long as there exists excess labor on reserve (i.e., as long as εt−1 ≤ γ), all
the ratios of output to labor stock given above (i.e., the top 3 rows) are procyclical for two
reasons. First, a positive innovation in demand in period t−1 (i.e., εt−1 > 0) raises produc-
tion (the numerator) instantaneously while leaving the total labor stock (the denominator)
intact, since labor on reserve serves as a buﬀer to replenish labor on line.6 Second, following
this positive innovation in demand the increase in productivity is persistent, because an
increase in εt−1 translates into an increase in εt−2 next period (which increases Et−2θt), this
raises the numerator more than it raises the corresponding denominator since the constant
terms in each numerator (e.g., 0,(k − (1 + ρ)γ),k) are strictly smaller respectively than the
constant term in the corresponding denominator (i.e., (1+ρ)γ). Hence, due to labor hoard-
ing, labor productivity should appear to be procyclical despite the fact that the production
technology, yt = mt, shows a constant output-to-labor ratio.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper shows that under demand uncertainty it is rational for ﬁrms to hold not only
e x c e s ss u p p l i e so fg o o d si ni n v e n t o r i e sb u ta l s oe x c e s ss u p p l i e so fl a b o ro nr e s e r v ea sp a r -
tial substitutes for good inventories. This conﬁrms Blinder’s (1981) conjecture about ﬁrms’
strategic behavior under demand uncertainty: ﬁrms rationally create excess production ca-
pacity by all means in order to enhance supply ﬂexibility. The optimal volume of labor
6Only when the innovation in demand is suﬃciently large so that the ﬁrm stockout of workers on reserve
(ht =0i fεt−1 > γ), output moves one-for-one with labor stock (i.e., the 4th row), resulting in labor
productivity being constant (acyclical).hoarding is shown to be related positively to the variance of demand and price level, and
negatively to interest rate and labor costs. The theoretical model provides not only a natural
framework for further empirical work on related issues but also a genuine micro foundation
for understanding the cyclical nature of employment and labor productivity.
The model can also be applied to studying optimal investment behavior and excess
capacity, as the labor stock in the model can be interpreted as capital stock, labor hoarding
as capacity hoarding, and hiring/ﬁring of labor as purchase/sales of equipments (investment).
Extra constraints may need be imposed on the model if investment is considered irreversible.References
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Since yt(= mt)=mt−1 +ht−1 +nt if ht = 0 (i.e., if εt−1 > ζ), and since st−1 =0i fεt−1 >k ,
the third term in the above equation can be expressed as (conditional on εt−1 > ζ and on





































where Φ() is the cumulative standard normal distribution function of ε. Hence we have
w =( β − δ)wΦ(
ζt
σ






















7The assumption, ζ ≥ k, will be conﬁrmed in proposition 3.2.Clearly, a constant, ζt = γ, solves the above equation; i.e., γ solves:
w =( β − δ)wΦ(
γ
σ






















where the integral is over εt−1 and the expectation is based on period t−2 information set,
hence the third term in the above expression is a constant after integration as the arguments
inside the integral involve only innovations (i.i.d. shocks) after t − 2.8¥
Appendix 002 (proof for proposition 2):
The goods inventory stock satisﬁes
st =
½
yt + st−1 − θt ;i fεt ≤ k
0; i f εt >k .
Since the optimal production (yt)s a t i s ﬁes
yt =
½
Et−1θt +( k − st−1); i f εt−1 ≤ γ
mt−1 + ht−1 + nt ;i fεt−1 > γ
and since the optimal hiring/ﬁring (n)s a t i s ﬁes






Et−1θt + k − θt ;i fεt ≤ k & εt−1 ≤ γ
Et−2θt +( 1+ρ)γ + st−1 − θt ;i fεt ≤ k & εt−1 > γ





k − εt ;i fεt ≤ k & εt−1 ≤ γ
st−1 +( 1+ρ)γ − εt − ρεt−1 ;i fεt ≤ k & εt−1 > γ
0; i f εt >k
8Namely, the conditional expectation, Et−2g(εt−1), is always a constant, where g() is any arbitrary
function.Notice that the lagged variable (st−1) can be further iterated backwards using the above





k − εt−1 ;i fεt−1 ≤ k & εt−2 ≤ γ
st−2 +( 1+ρ)γ − εt−1 − ρεt−2 ;i fεt−1 ≤ k & εt−2 > γ
0; i f εt−1 >k
,
which may lead to inﬁnite regression, resulting in the series {st} being nonstationary, which
cannot be an equilibrium unless the condition
st−1 =0 , if εt−1 > γ;





k − εt ;i fεt ≤ k & εt−1 ≤ γ
(1 + ρ)γ − εt − ρεt−1 ;i fεt ≤ k & εt−1 > γ
0; i f εt >k
.
S i n c ew ek n o wt h a tst−1 =0i fa n do n l yi fεt−1 >k , hence, if the condition, γ ≥ k, holds,
then εt−1 > γ automatically implies εt−1 >k ,which yields a stationary process for st and it
is therefore an equilibrium. Hence, γ ≥ k must be true.¥
Appendix 003 (proof for proposition 3):
The decision rule for st is proved in the proof for proposition 3.2. The rest can be obtained
by following the discussions in section 3 above using straightforward substitutions. What
is left to show is the equation, ¯ λ = β(1 − δ)w.N o t eλs
t = ¯ λ if εt ≤ k (i.e., if πs
t =0 ) . O n
the other hand, since the current period shadow price of intermediate goods is known based
on last period information set, as all variables in the resource constraint (4) are known in




t+1.S i n c eλh
t =( β − δ)w if εt−1 ≤ γ
according equation (10) and equation (8),9 we have λh
t+1 =( β −δ)w if εt ≤ γ.A c c o r d i n gt o
proposition 3.2, k<γ, hence λs
t = ¯ λ implies λh
t+1 =( β − δ)w (since εt ≤ k implies εt ≤ γ).
A c c o r d i n gt oe q u a t i o n( 9 ) ,Etλs
t+1 =( 1− β)w + λh





(1 − β)w + λh
t+1
¢
= β(1 − δ)w, if εt ≤ k.
9Equation (8) implies Et−1λh
t+1 = w.¥
Appendix 004 (proof for proposition 4):
Equation (16) can be rewritten as
(2 − β)w =
Z γ
−∞


















The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (17) pertains to the case of no stockout in labor
reserve, and the second term pertains to the case of a stockout in labor reserve. Hence
the right hand side of equation (17) is a convex combination of two terms, (1 − δ)w and
F(γ,σ,εt−1). Since (1 − δ)w<(2 − β)w,w em u s th a v eF>(2 − β)w>(1 − δ)w.G i v e n
F>(1 −δ)w, the right hand side of (17) clearly depends negatively on γ if F also depends
negatively on γ. Furthermore, the right-hand-side of (17) moves in the same direction with
F as the other parameters {σ,β,δ,ρ} change.
1). Show
∂γ
∂σ > 0. First, we show that F() is decreasing in γ and increasing in σ.
Diﬀerentiating F with respect to γ gives:
∂F
∂γ











Since β(1 − δ)w<p ,and since ∂Φ
∂γ > 0a n d∂Φ
∂σ < 0, hence we have ∂F
∂γ < 0a n d∂F
∂σ > 0.
Therefore, the right-hand side of (17) increases with σ and decreases with γ.G i v e n t h a t
the left hand side of (17) does not depend on {γ,σ},a ni n c r e a s ei nσ thus must imply an
increase in γ in order to keep the right hand side of (17) unchanged.2). Show
∂γ
∂p > 0. It is clear that F increases with p. Given that the left hand side of
(17) does not depend on p,a ni n c r e a s ei np must imply an increase in γ in order to keep the
right hand side of equation (17) unchanged.
3). Show
∂γ
∂δ < 0. It is clear that the right side of (17) is decreasing in δ. Given that the
right hand side of (17) is also decreasing in γ, an increase in δ must imply a decrease in γ
in order to keep equation (17) unchanged.
4). Show
∂γ
∂β > 0. D u et oa ni n c r e a s ei nβ, the marginal eﬀect on the left hand side is









(1 + ρ)γ − ρεt−1
σ
)f(ε)dε > 0.
Given that the right hand side of (17) is decreasing in γ,a ni n c r e a s ei nβ must imply an
increase in γ so as to oﬀset the positive eﬀect of β on F.
5). Show
∂γ
∂w < 0. For an increase in w, the marginal eﬀect on the left hand side is
(2 − β) > 0, and the marginal eﬀect on the right hand side is given by
Z γ
−∞























< (1 − δ)
< (2 − β).
Hence the left hand side increases more than the right hand side does after w changes. Thus
γ must decrease so as to balance out the relative fall on the right hand side of equation
(17).¥